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Introduction

Most of the response brief addresses issues that are not in dispute on
appeal. The issues on appeal are (i) whether Okland considered the California
vacation house his principal domicile during the 42 days he spent there from
February 17, 2011, to April1, 2011; (ii) whether 42 days in a common abode is
more than a "temporary or brief period of time" under the test for cohabitation;
and (iii) whether the cohabitation statute requires that cohabitation be ongoing to
terminate alimony. The response brief barely addresses those three issues.
Instead, the response brief devotes considerable space to describing the
sexual relationship betweenJillian and Okland. (Resp.Br. at 8-10, 12-14.) But as
the panel noted, it is undisputed that Jillian and Okland had a "relatively
permanent sexual relationship." Scott v. Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ,-r 10, 368 P.3d 133
("' Op.") Jillian did not challenge that ruling before the panel and does not
challenge it here. Those sections of the response brief are beside the point.
The response brief also devotes considerable space to describing the
various vacations Jillian and Okland took prior to February 17, 2011. (Resp.Br. at
8-11, 49.) But the panel reversed the trial court's ruling that cohabitation began
before February 17. (Op. ,-r 38.) Bradley did not file a cross-petition to challenge
that holding. The vacations before February 17 also are beside the point.
The response brief also repeatedly accuses Jillian of challenging findings of
fact, an accusation presented to and rejected by the panel. (Op. ,-r 8.) Because the
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trial court did not find that Okland considered the California vacation house to
be his principal residence, let alone his principal domicile, there is no need to
challenge a finding of fact on that point. And because the trial court considered
whether 144 days-not the 42 days now at issue-constitutes umore than a
temporary or brief period of time," there is no finding to challenge on that point
either. The issues presented are questions of law, not questions of fact.
When the response brief does address the issues presented, it advances
arguments that ignore the panel decision and controlling precedent. Bradley
asserts in two sentences that the panel should not have addressed Jillian' s
argument that the statute requires cohabitation to be ongoing to terminate
alimony. (Resp.Br. at 50.) Bradley does not address the panel's explanation of
why it addressed the issue and does not provide any factual or legal analysis as
to why the panel erred in addressing it. Bradley has inadequately briefed the
issue and this court should disregard it. Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants,
L.L.C., 2012 UT 17,

~

11,279 P.3d 391 (courts have udiscretion to not address an

inadequately briefed argument'' (internal quotation marks omitted)). Bradley's
assertion is also contrary to precedent, which allows appellate courts to address a
controlling statute governing the issue presented. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT
68,

~

11,266 P.3d 828 ("'Our preservation rule does not prevent [an appellant]

from arguing the applicability of ... controlling authority that directly bears
.
") .
upon the ISsue....

2

The three issues presented in the opening brief are therefore both legal in
nature and squarely presented. And each one provides a ground to reverse.

Domicile- To terminate alimony, the trial court had to rule that the
California vacation house was the principal domicile for Jillian and Okland. But
the trial court did not find that it was Okland' s principal domicile, or even his
principal residence. As the trial court recognized in its findings of fact, the only
evidence was to the contrary: "Mr. Okland testified Rancho Santa Fe was not
intended to be his primary residence and he returned to Salt Lake City on or
about April1, 2011 and broke up with [Jillian]." (R. 2255.) Because the California
vacation house was never Okland' s principal domicile or residence, Bradley did
not satisfy the test for cohabitation.

Brief Period of Time - Even if there had been cohabitation, the
cohabitation had to last for more than a temporary or brief period of time. Here,
the panel opinion reversed the trial court's ruling that cohabitation began in
December 2010 and lasted 144 days. (R. 2272; Op.

~

15.) The panel instead held

that cohabitation began on February 17, 2011, which was 42 days before Okland
ended the relationship on April1, 2011. (Op.

~

15.) In all other jurisdictions, 42

days is not nearly long enough for cohabitation to terminate alimony. This court
should clarify that Utah requires cohabitation to last for at least a few months to
constitute a relationship capable of replacing the financial need for alimony.

3

Ongoing Cohabitation - Even if there had been cohabitation and the

cohabitation had lasted for more than a temporary or brief period of time, any
cohabitation ended well before Bradley filed his petition and "established''
cohabitation. Jillian argued that the plain language of section 30-3-5(10) requires
cohabitation to be ongoing to terminate alimony. The response brief does not
argue that the language is ambiguous or that an exception to enforcing the plain
language applies. Because Bradley failed to address the issue, this court may
reverse on that ground. Broderick, 2012 UT 17, ~ 11 (affirming because appellee
failed to address appellant's arguments).
Instead of addressing the plain language of section 30-3-5(10), Bradley
mentions the cohabitation test in three other states. But a comparison to other
states only provides support for enforcing the plain language. Thirty-six states
require that the cohabitation change the recipient's economic status, like a new
job. Another four states terminate alimony only if the recipient cohabitates for a
time period specified by statute, the shortest of which is 90 days- more than
double the 42 days here. These statutes demonstrate that a rational legislator
could have intended to require ongoing cohabitation to terminate alimony under
section 30-3-5(10). Because Bradley has not shown how the absurdity doctrine
precludes enforcing the plain language, this court should require ongoing
cohabitation to terminate alimony. Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48,
This court can reverse on any of those three grounds.

4

~

31, --- P.3d ---.

Argument
In what follows, Jillian first demonstrates that she is not challenging

findings of fact, for the reasons recognized by the court of appeals. Jillian then
replies to Bradley's arguments that address the issues presented on appeal.
1.

Jillian is not challenging findings of fact

The opening brief and the panel addressed questions of law. (Op.Br. at
2,3,39-42). 1 The response brief nonetheless discusses findings of fact, most of
which concern a time period no longer relevant (before February 17) and factual
issues no longer in dispute (the sexual relationship). (Resp.Br. at 8-10,12-14,2935.) Jillian is not challenging those findings because they are legally irrelevant.
As for the standard of review, Myers II governs. Under Myers II, certain
challenged findings are "pure findings of fact subject to clearly erroneous review.
But some of those findings [are] premised on embedded questions of law, which
are reviewed for correctness." Myers v. Myers (Myers II), 2011 UT 65, ,-r 34,266
P.3d 806. Myers II explained that" a misconception of the governing legal
standard," such as the failure to understand "[t]he impact of common residency
and of a sexual relationship on the determination of cohabitation are questions of
law on which no deference is due, since they do not call for proof' but rather for
I

I

argument."' Id. ,-r 36.

At the end of the opening brief, it was important to Jillian to clarify certain
facts, but she stated that those facts are immaterial:" Although immaterial under
the correct legal standard, it is worth correcting a few factual errors in the panel
opinion." (Op.Br. at 39 (emphasis added).)
1

5

As Jillian explained in her opening briefs in this court and the court of
appeals, the district court misconceived the test for cohabitation. The panel
agreed that the issues presented questions of law. (Op.

~

8.) And because the

issues addressed by the panel were questions of law, and this court reviews the
panel's opinion for correctness, the issues here present questions of law. Most of
the response brief addresses findings of fact that are neither at issue nor relevant.
2.

The response brief does not address the finding that Okland did not
consider the California house to be his principal residence or explain
why this court said "domicile" but meant something other than domicile

For over thirty years, this court's cohabitation test has been stable: two
parties cohabitate "'only if they establish a common abode that both parties
consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of
time" and have a sexual relationship. Myers II, 2011 UT 65,

~~

16-17 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The panel changed this test. It held that this court did
not mean domicile by"' domicile," but instead meant residence. (Op.

~

18.)

But even if this court used "'principal domicile" to mean principal
residence, this court still should reverse because the trial court did not find that
the California home was Okland' s principal residence or his principal domicile.
The only finding of fact that addresses the issue says the opposite: "'Mr. Okland
testified Rancho Santa Fe was not intended to be his primary residence and he
returned to Salt Lake City on or about April1, 2011 and broke up with [Jillian] ."
(R.2255.) Based upon this finding of fact, Bradley is incorrect that the trial court
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was "entitled to find that [Okland's] domicile was Rancho Santa Fe." (Resp.Br. at
46.) The trial court did not make that finding, and in light of the findings it did
make, it was not entitled to do so.
Bradley also asserts, without citation to the record, that Okland
"represented that he lived with Ms. Scott on a full time permanent basis." (Id. at
46.) That was not Okland's testimony. And if Bradley bases that assertion on
Okland' s application for membership at a golf course in California, in which he
indicated that Ms. Scott should have "family status" privileges, that fact has
nothing to do with whether the California house was Okland' s principal
domicile or residence. There is no record basis for finding that the California
house was Okland' s principal domicile, which is why that finding is absent.
Otherwise, Bradley asserts that Okland transported personal items and
possessions to the California house. (Id. at 46.) But this not only finds scant
support in the record, it also, as explained on pages 39-41 of the opening brief,
does not show that Okland intended the California house to be his principal
domicile or residence, especially in light of the finding of fact that says that the
California house "was not intended to be his primary residence." (R.2255.)
For those reasons, even if the panel were correct that this court used the
word "domicile" to mean residence, the record and findings indicate that the
California house was not Okland' s principal residence. This court can reverse on
that ground alone without clarifying whether "domicile" means domicile.

7

But this court should clarify that "domicile" means domicile in the test for
cohabitation, which is its meaning in every other legal context. In doing so, this
court should reject how Bradley and the panel read its prior cases.
2.1

The panel opinion conflicts with Haddow, Knuteson, and Myers II

Bradley ignores the language used by this court for decades and
1

characterizes Jillian' s argument concerning domicile as "Ms. Scott's domicile'
1

test," (Resp.Br. at 45) and "the one-domicile' formulation that Ms. Scott
proposes." (Id. at 43.) But Jillian is not asking this court to begin using the word
"domicile" in its cohabitation test. This court has used the word for decades, in
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387

(Utah 1980), and Myers II.
At times recognizing the problem, Bradley states that the test is intended
to be "flexible." (Resp.Br. at 43.) While the overall test is flexible, the element that
requires domicile is no more or less flexible than it is in other legal contexts. To
conclude otherwise, Bradley, like the panel, misreads this court's decisions in
Haddow, Knuteson, and Myers II.

Bradley describes Haddow as follows: "In Haddow, for example-where the
couple each maintained a separate home-this Court did not engage in a
formulistic test to determine which of the two homes the couple's true domicile
was and then determine whether the couple shared that home. Rather, this Court
focused on whether the couple lived together in either one or both of the two

8

homes in a marriage-like arrangement." (Resp.Br. at 42-43.) This is not accurate.

In Haddow, only the ex-wife's house was in question. 707 P.2d at 670-71. There
was no dispute that it was her domicile. Id. at 670. The only question was
whether it was also the boyfriend's domicile. Id. at 671-72. This court held that
J'J'the common residency element of cohabitation has not been established"
because neither the ex-wife nor the boyfriend considered the home to be the
boyfriend's "principal residence." Id. at 674. The court therefore held that the
couple was not cohabitating. Id.
Bradley also misreads Knuteson. Bradley describes Knuteson as another
J'J'

case where two homes were involved, [and] this Court did not employ Ms.
Scott's i one-home' analysis. Rather, the question was whether the couple's living
arrangements were akin to a marriage." (Resp.Br. at 43.) This also is not accurate.

In Knuteson, the court determined that the couple was not cohabitating because
J'J'Mrs. Knuteson was not a iresident' in [her boyfriend's] home in the statutory
sense." 619 P.2d at 1389. That sentence not only demonstrates that this court
concluded Mrs. Knuteson was not a resident, it confirms that the court intends
the words to be used J'J'in their statutory sense," and not in a vague and J'J'flexible"
way that parties cannot predict or apply to their circumstances without litigation.
Bradley also misreads Myers II. He describes it as holding that the
J'J'

i

common residency' element was not met because the couple's living

arrangements did not resemble those of a married couple- for example,

9

Ms. Myers slept on the couch while M.H. had a separate room, they shared no
common household duties or expenses, and the nature of their sexual
relationship was likewise not permanene' (Resp.Br. at 44.) But in Myers II, the
divorced woman was living with her parents, who were housing a foster teen.
2011 UT 65,

~

1. The two may have had a sexual relationship. Id.

~

4. And

because they also lived in the same house, this court assumed the two threshold
elements of the test (common residency and sexual relationship) were satisfied.

Id.

~

22. This court concluded the parties were not cohabiting. The court wrote

that [e]ven ifMs. Myers and [the foster teen] had a sexual relationship and lived
11

together under the same roof, their relationship had almost none of the other
hallmarks of a marriage." Id.

~

39 (emphasis added). In other words, Myers II did

not conclude, as Bradley asserts, that the couple's living arrangements did not
II

resemble those of a married couple." (Resp.Br. at 44.) It assumed that the living
arrangements did resemble that of a married couple but still held that the
relationship was not like that of a married couple.

In short, Bradley's statement that the test for cohabitation is flexible, while
certainly correct in general, does not entail that this court's use of the term
"domicile" means something other than domicile or is more flexible than it is in
other legal contexts. The term does not refer to the nature of the parties' sexual
relationship. It means domicile, just as it does in all other legal contexts. And this
court's case law does not hold otherwise.

10

2.2

The panel erred when it defined "domicile" differently in this
context than in all other legal contexts

Bradley also asserts that ~~domicile" means something different in the test
for cohabitation than in every other legal context. (Resp.Br. at 43.) But the case
law confirms that the traditional domicile requirement remains part of the test.
Myers II refers to the ~~notion of 'common residency'" in Bustamante v.
Bustamante, 645 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah 1982). Myers II, 2011 UT 65,

~

35 & n.7. In

Bustamante, the court defined the term ~~residency" in the divorce context with

reference to the following factors:

~~voting,

owning property, paying taxes,

having family in the area, maintaining a mailing address, being born or raised in
the area, working or operating a business, and having children attend school in
the forum." 645 P.2d at 41. This is not a special test for the divorce context.
At times recognizing the problem with his position, Bradley also asserts
that the word~~ domicile" itself is problematic, even though it has operated in
legal contexts for centuries. (Resp.Br. at 43.) His support is a dissenting opinion
written by Justice Frankfurter in 1939, which observes that the term~~ domicile" is
problematic when applied to the wealthy. (Id. at45 (citing Texas v. Florida, 306
U.S. 398,429 (1939)). But the majority disagreed, and pointed out that every
person can have only one domicile that, once established, remains that person's
domicile until affirmatively changed. Texas, 306 U.S. at 424-25. It is not clear how
the dissenting opinion in a United States Supreme Court case decided nearly 70

11

11

years ago is relevant to what this court means by the term domicile" in its test
for cohabitation.2

In short, Bradley provides no reason, either in this court's case law or in
the dissenting opinions of other courts, to conclude that this court used the term
11

domicile" to mean anything other than domicile. Even though there is no

evidence, or finding, that Okland considered the California home to be his
principal domicile or principal residence, this court should clarify that
II

domicile" means domicile, not residence. Either way, this court should reverse.

3.

The response brief does not explain how ''temporary or brief period of
time" refers to a state of mind
11

The phrase temporary or brief period of time" concerns the duration of
cohabitation, not the state of mind of those cohabitating. Bradley and the panel
assert otherwise and obscure the test. (Op. ,-r 22.)
In response, Bradley does not address whether 42 days is more than a
temporary or brief period of time. Instead, he characterizes Jillian' s position as
11

follows: couples should be given a trial-period to determine whether their
2 In a footnote, Bradley raises various concerns about using the definition of
domicile" in the cohabitation context. He refers to it as an artificial 'one-homemaximum' test," and cites concerns that a couple who traveled for a living, or
who transferred frequently, or who were in the military, or who do not have a
steady home, could never qualify as 'cohabitating."' (Resp.Br. at 45 & n.11.)
These concerns are a mirage. They are the same concerns that arise in any other
context involving domicile and can be resolved in the same way: a multi-factor
test in which domicile changes only when the person abandons their old
domicile, establishes a new one, and demonstrates an intent to remain. O'Rourke
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 830 P.2d 230, 232 n.l (Utah 1992). Applying the
traditional test for domicile is no more difficult or troublesome in this context
than in any other legal context.
11

II

II

12

marriage-like-living arrangement will work." (Resp.Br. at 46.) But that is
demonstrably correct under the current test. Living in the common abode for
only a temporary or brief period of time is not sufficient under the test. It takes
more than a temporary or brief period of time for cohabitation. The question is

what constitutes more than a temporary or brief period of time, and Bradley's
observation that parties have a trial period unless a single day is enough to
terminate alimony does not address the issue.
And this court already has explained how to answer this question. This
court has long maintained that '"[c]ohabitation is not a sojourn, nor a habit of
visiting, nor even remaining with for a time; the term implies continuity."' Myers
II, 2011 UT 65,

~

26 (quoting Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673). And while Bradley is

correct that Knuteson and Haddow address the issue further, he is incorrect that
those cases refer to a state of mind rather than a period of time.
As to Knuteson, Bradley relies on the same incorrect interpretation set forth
by the panel. (Resp.Br. at 47; Op.

~

23.) He states that the court in Knuteson

"found it significant that neither the ex-wife nor neighbor' consider[ed]' the
neighbors' [sic] home to be the ex-wife's 'principle [sic] domicile for more than a
temporary or brief period of time."' (Resp.Br. at 47.) But Mrs. Knuteson was not a
""resident' ....in the statutory sense," confirming that the ordinary meanings of
words should be applied. Knuteson, 619 P.2d at 1389. This court also held "that
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the wording of the statute does not appear to cover a temporary stay at another's
home." I d. Bradley's characterization is incorrect.
Bradley also incorrectly reads Haddow. He states that Haddow n asked
whether an alimony recipient's time spent in boyfriend's home amounted to
cohabitation." (Resp.Br. at 48.) But Haddow held that the boyfriend was never a
"resident" in the ex-wife's home. 707 P.2d at 673. The question was not how long
he was a resident. The case law does not support Bradley's novel test.
3.1

No other jurisdiction has terminated alimony on the basis of
cohabitation that lasted 42 days

Bradley at times suggests that allowing couples a ntrial period" would be
absurd. (Resp.Br. at 46.) He states, n[a]ccording to ITillian], couples should be
given a trial-period to determine whether their marriage-like-living arrangement
will work" (Id. at 46.) He turns to South Carolina's statute, which expressly
states that alimony may be terminated if the couple lives together for

/If

ninety or

more consecutive days."' (Id. at 47.) It is worth noting that South Carolina gives
couples a ntrial period" of eighty-nine days-more than twice as long as the
period here. Even more revealing, however, is what all the states Bradley omits
say about how long a couple must cohabitate to terminate alimony.
The clear majority of states- thirty-six- do not consider cohabitation to be
an event that automatically terminates alimony. Twelve states by statute allow
the modification or termination of alimony based on cohabitation, but only if the
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recipient's financial circumstances have changed, much like getting a new job.3
Twenty-four states have the same rule, but the rule developed in the case law.4
What these thirty-six states have in common is an appreciation that alimony is an
economic arrangement that changes only if the recipient's economic status has
changed. Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family Law?, 13 J.L. &
Fam. Stud. 289 (2011) (reviewing various approaches to cohabitation in a variety
of settings).

3 Cal. Fam. Code§ 4323(a)(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-86(b); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 13, § 1512; Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 61.14(b)(1); Ga. Code Ann.§ 19-6-19(b); Iowa
Code Ann.§ 598.21c(1); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 208, § 49(d); Mo. Ann. Stat.§
452.370(1); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 248; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 134(C); Tenn. Code
Ann.§ 36-5-121(£)(2)(B); W.Va. Code Ann.§ 48-5-707(a)(1).
4 Smith v. Mangum, 747 P.2d 609, 611 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (stating majority
rule that "courts modify the amount of spousal maintenance received by the
cohabiting ex-spouse only if the spouse's support needs have changed"); see also
Musgrove v. Musgrove, 821 P.2d 1366,1370 (Alaska 1991); In reMarriage of Dwyer,
825 P.2d 1018, 1019 (Colo. App. 1991); Amii v. Amii, 695 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1985); Myers v. Myers, 560 N.E.2d 39,43 (Ind. 1990); Block v. Block, 252
S.W.3d 156, 161 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); Whittington 1}. Whittington, 914 A.2d 212, 226
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007); Ianitelli v. Ianitelli, 502 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993); Sieber v. Sieber, 258 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1977); Alexis v. Tarver, 879 So.
2d 1078,1080 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); In reMarriage of Bross, 845 P.2d 728,731-32
(Mont. 1993); Else v. Else, 367 N.W.2d 701,704 (Neb. 1985); Gilman v. Gilman, 956
P.2d 761, 764 (Nev. 1998); Bisig v. Bisig, 469 A.2d 1348, 1350 (N.H. 1983); Gayet v.
Gayet, 456 A.2d 102, 104 (N.J. 1983); Cherpelis v. Cherpelis, 1996-NMCA-037, 121
N.M. 500, ~ 6, 914 P.2d 637, 638; Bussey v. Bussey, 563 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1988); In reMarriage of Morrison, 910 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Or. Ct. App. 1996);
Goldman v. Goldman, 543 A.2d 1304,1306-07 (R.I. 1988); Moore v. Moore, 2009 S.D.
16, ~ 22, 763 N.W.2d 536; Miller v. Miller, 2005 VT 122, ~ 18, 179 Vt. 147, 892 A.2d
175; In reMarriage of Tower, 780 P.2d 863, 867 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Taake v.
Taake, 233 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Wis. 1975); Maher v. Maher, 2004 WY 62, ~ 8, 90 P.3d
739 (Wyo. 2004).

15

Only twelve states terminate alimony if the recipient cohabitates,
regardless of whether her economic status has changed.s Of those, four states
specify by statute the length of cohabitation required. As Bradley indicated,
South Carolina is such a state, requiring cohabitation for at least ninety days. The
other three states require that cohabitation last more than a year to terminate
alimony. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 951-A(12) (requiring cohabitation to have
existed for at least 12 months out of 18 consecutive months); N.D. Cent. Code
Ann.§ 14-05-24.1(3) (one year); Va. Code Ann.§ 20-109(A) (one year).
The statutes in Utah and seven other states allow the courts to define what
constitutes a sufficient length of time for cohabitation to terminate alimony. Ala.
Code§ 30-2-55; Ark Code Ann.§ 9-12-312(a)(2); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/510(c); La. Civ. Code Ann. Art. 115; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 50-16.9(b); 23 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 3706; Tex. Fam. Code Ann.§ 8.056(b). In those states, Jillian
has found no case terminating alimony based upon cohabitation that lasted 42
days or fewer, except a few cases more than three decades old where the
cohabitation was stable and continuing. See, e.g., Roofe v. Roofe, 460 N.E.2d 784,
785 (Ill. App. 1984).
The shortest period Jillian has found is nine weeks- fifty percent longer
than the 42 days at issue here. Lobaugh v. Lobaugh, 753 A.2d 834, 837 (Pa. Super.

s Two other states, Idaho and Kansas, rely primarily on a contract between the
parties. Foster v. Schorr, 82 P.3d 845 (Idaho 2003); In reMarriage of Kuzanek, 105
P.3d 1253 (Kan. 2005).
16

Ct. 2000). Most states require cohabitation for many months, which is consistent
with this court's holding in in Knuteson that two months and ten days was "a
temporary stay." 619 P.2d at 1389; Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672 (describing Knuteson
as holding that "a stay of two months and ten days did not establish a 'settled
abode'").
In other words, far from being absurd, giving couples a "trial period to

determine whether their marriage-like-living arrangement will work" is the
rational position adopted by every state. It is consistent with the policy
underlying alimony, which concerns the recipient's economic needs. It is
consistent with a policy of encouraging recipients to pursue new romantic
relationships without fear of financial repercussions. This court should reverse
the panel's decision, which appears to be the only decision in the country
terminating alimony where cohabitation had ended and lasted only 42 days.
3.2

Jillian and Okland were not in the California house for .1/more
than a temporary or brief period of time"

Rather than addressing the 42 days of cohabitation found by the panel,
Bradley asserts that the cohabitation lasted longer. Bradley states that Jillian lived
in the California house for approximately eighty-seven days and that this is the
relevant time period. (Resp.Br. at 49.) But whenever the time period began, it
ended on April1, when Okland ended the relationship. (Op.Br. at 36.) It is
difficult to understand how parties can continue to satisfy the test for
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cohabitation after one party- here, Okland- ends their relationship and no
longer lives in the same state, let alone the same house. Bradley never explains.
11

Bradley instead suggests that the panel erred in limiting the time of
cohabitation to six weeks," but should have looked to the relationship before that
time. (Resp.Br. at 49.) In essence, Bradley assumes that the trial court was correct
in ruling that cohabitation began in December 2010, the very ruling reversed by
the panel in its opinion when it held that cohabitation could not have begun until
February 17, 2011. (Op.

~

15.) Bradley could have cross-petitioned to challenge

the holding by the panel, but did not. Utah R. App. P. 47. It is therefore not
before this court. Bradley's challenge to the panel's decision is also inadequately
briefed and insufficient to overturn the panel decision. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
In short, this court should reject the panel's holding that 42 days of
cohabitation is sufficient to terminate alimony. This court should clarify that
cohabitation must last at least ninety days- the shortest period that terminates
alimony in other states. This court should reverse the order terminating Jillian' s
alimony and order the trial court to reinstate alimony and order back pay.
4.

This court should enforce the plain language of section 30-3-5(10)

This court also should reverse because cohabitation was not ongoing, a
requirement under the plain language of the statute. The cohabitation statute
uses the present tense verb: Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
II

former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that
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the former spouse is cohabitating with another person." Utah Code § 30-3-5(10)
(emphasis added). In the opening brief, Jillian argued that the plain language of
the statute required cohabitation to be ongoing and did not violate the absurdity
doctrine. In response, Bradley ignores both.
4.1

Bradley incorrectly asserts that this court should not address the
argument because it is not preserved

In one sentence, Bradley asserts that the argument concerning the plain
language of the statute was not preserved and the panel should not have
addressed it. (Resp.Br. at 50.) He has not adequately briefed the issue; nor could
he. "Issues must be preserved, not arguments for or against a particular ruling on
an issue raised below." Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63,

~

45,323 P.3d 998

(emphasis in original); see also Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48,

~

26 n. 23, --- P.3d ---.

The issue of cohabitation was preserved.
Moreover, the panel addressed the question, having determined it was
essential to interpretation of the statute. (Op.

~

27 n. 8.) The paneY s approach

adheres to Patterson v. Patterson, in which this court held it would not disregard
an unpreserved but controlling statutory argument. 2011 UT 68,

~

20, 266 P.3d

828. This court reviews the panel decision for correctness. Here, the panel
decision is contrary to the plain language of the statute. This court should review
that decision and enforce the plain language.
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4.2

Bradley's brief fails to confront the plain language of section 30-35(10) and should be disregarded under Broderick

Bradley fails to address the plain language of section 30-3-5(10) and the
issues presented in the opening brief. An appellee's brief must address the issues
presented in the opening brief. Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, L.L.C.,
2012 UT 17, ~ 10,279 P.3d 391. If it "fail[s] to address or refute [the appellant's]
points," it may be disregarded. Id.

~

14.

Bradley paraphrases the statutory language and, in doing so, changes its
meaning, a move that acknowledges he loses under the plain language. Bradley
asserts that the statute says, "cohabitation automatically terminates alimony
upon a finding of cohabitation regardless of whether the couple eventually
separates or terminates their cohabitation." (Resp.Br. at 51.) The language
actually says, "Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former
spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the
former spouse is cohabitating with another person." Utah Code § 30-3-5(10)
(emphasis added). Bradley does not argue that the language is ambiguous,
because it is not ambiguous.6 The plain language therefore governs.

6 Oddly, Bradley quotes legislative history that confirms the plain-language
interpretation that requires ongoing cohabitation: mlf someone really is
cohabitating, they are living with another person in that companionship
relationship that is at least commensurate with marriage, then alimony ought to
stop .... If they are in a substitute marriage relationship, alimony ought to
end."' (Resp.Br. at 36 (quoting 51st Legislature, Utah House of Representative,
Floor Debate, Tape No.1 (January 23,1995 morning session).)
20

The opening brief also explained that the plain language governs unless,
under the absurdity doctrine, ''no rational legislator could have intended" the
statute to mean what it says. Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75,, 46,375
P.2d 992. This court confirmed that approach in Bagley v. Bagley, and concluded
that "[a]bsent an overwhelmingly absurd result, we will not modify the
statutes." 2016 UT 48, , , 27-29, 31. Jillian explained that a rational legislator
could have intended the statute to require ongoing cohabitation to replace the
need for alimony before alimony can be terminated. (Op.Br. at 18.) She addressed
supportive and relevant policy considerations under the absurdity doctrine. (Id.)
Bradley does not mention the absurdity doctrine. He instead cites to a
court of appeals case, Black v. Black, that does not squarely address the issue
(Resp.Br. at 50, citing Black, 2008 UT App 465, , 8, 199 P.3d 371.) He also cites a
theoretical consequence of reading the statute according to its plain language (i.e.
that "one half of a couple could simply move out"). (Resp.Br. at 52-53.) Bradley's
brief fails to confront this issue.
This court should reverse. Bradley not only does not address the
arguments in the opening brief, he also has not shown that an exception to
enforcing plain language applies. Broderick, 2012 UT 17, , 10.
4.2.1

The majority of other states also require cohabitation to
be ongoing in order to justify termination of alimony

Instead of addressing the plain language of Utah's statute, Bradley cites
statutes in Connecticut, Florida, and Oklahoma for the unremarkable proposition
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that some states have different statutes that operate differently. (Resp.Br. at 5051.) Bradley avoids mentioning states that interpret their statutes to require
ongoing cohabitation. It is worth understanding why.
A survey of other states sheds light on how rational legislators can address
the termination of alimony. As explained above, thirty-six states allow for
alimony to be adjusted on the basis of cohabitation only where the recipient's
economic circumstances have changed as a result of the cohabitation. In these
states, cohabitation is one of many other "changes in circumstances" that may
justify a modification of alimony. In these states, a relationship that had ended
would not support a modification of alimony because the recipient's economic
circumstances would not have changed. And if alimony is terminated, but
economic circumstances change again, a former recipient can petition to have
alimony restored. The fact that Utah allows alimony to be restored only after a

remarriage that is annulled suggests that it should be more difficult, not less
difficult, to terminate alimony based upon cohabitation in the first instance?
The statutes in other states are also revealing, as they disclose various
approaches to terminating alimony based upon cohabitation.

7

Oddly, Bradley asserts that the fact that alimony can be restored after the
annulment of a marriage means it should be easier to terminate alimony based
upon cohabitation. (Resp.Br. at 51-52.) Bradley never explains this
counterintuitive assertion so Jillian does not address it further.
22

• Two states, Louisiana and Pennsylvania, allow for alimony to be
terminated if the recipient nhas cohabited." LSA-C.C. Art. 115; 23 Pa.
C.S.A. § 3706.
• Five other states use the present tense in their cohabitation tests. Ala.
Code 1975 § 30-2-55 (requiring termination if recipient ''is living
openly or cohabiting"); Ark. Code Ann.§ 9-12-312(a)(2)(D)(Supp.
2013) (requiring termination upon nliving full time with another
person in an intimate, cohabitating relationship"); 750 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 5/510 (requiring termination nif the party receiving
maintenance cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing
conjugal basis"); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 50-16.9 (requiring
termination if a party cohabitates, which nmeans the act of two
adults dwelling together continuously and habitually"); Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 8.056(b) (requiring termination if recipient n cohabits
with another person with whom the obligee has a dating or romantic
relationship in a permanent place of abode on a continuing basis").
•

And four other states specify the duration of cohabitation to
terminate alimony. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 19-A § 951-A(12) (2013);
N.D. Cent. Code Ann.§ 14-05-24.1; S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130; Va.
Code Ann.§ 20-109.

In those states with statutes that contemplate cohabitation will be ongoing,
rational legislators intended that result.
Regardless of what other states do, because a rational legislator could have
intended the Utah statute to be read according to its plain language, this court
should enforce the plain language. Utley, 2015 UT 75,

~~

29, 46. As this court

recently reaffirmed, n[a]bsent an overwhelmingly absurd result, [this court] will
not modify the statutes." Bagley, 2016 UT 48,

~

31.

Bradley does not argue that no rational legislator could have intended that
cohabitation be ongoing, but instead provides reasons why a rational legislator
might disagree with that position, something that describes the possible
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legislative options, but does not show the plain language here is absurd. Bradley
asserts that "[i]f 'current cohabitation' were the test under the statute, then one
half of a couple could simply move out any time a petition for termination is
filed." (Resp.Br. at 52-53.) But there is no evidence this is a problem in any state.
Courts are free to deny relief "when the offending conduct ceases and the court
finds that there is no reasonable expectation that it will resume." Am. Express
Travel Related Servs. Co. v. MasterCard Int'l Inc., 776 F. Supp. 787, 790 (S.D.N.Y.

1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the offending conduct is likely
to resume, perhaps courts could terminate alimony, as the court of appeals did in
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

Regardless, Bradley has not shown what he must-that no rational
legislator could have intended to require ongoing cohabitation with the plain
language of section 30-3-5(10). This court should reverse.
4.3

The three cases Bradley cites involve a boyfriend moving out to
circumvent the litigation

The three cases from other jurisdictions that Bradley cites in the response
brief are also inapposite. (Resp. Br. at 52.) One case has been overturned, and the
other two cases involved current boyfriends.
Bradley first cites McRae v. McRae, 381 So. 2d 1052 (Miss. 1980). Bradley
does not mention that the Mississippi Supreme Court revisited that decision in
1994 and held that it improperly reflected "a moral judgment that a divorced
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woman should not engage in sexual relations." Hammonds v. Hammonds, 641
So. 2d 1211, 1216 (Miss. 1994). McRae is not good law.
Bradley next cites, J.N. v. M.N., an unpublished decision of the Family
Court in Delaware. No. CN05-06443, 2007 WL 5361879 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 23,
2007). In that case, the alimony recipient claimed that she was not cohabitating.

Id. at *3. The trial court concluded she was cohabitating at the time the petition to
terminate was filed. Id. at *8. After that, her boyfriend moved out, but the court
appears to have found that was pretextual, as it was in Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 161.
Finally, Bradley cites In reMarriage of Frasco, 638 N.E.2d 655 (Ill. App.
1994). In that case, the court held that the a totality of the evidence evinces a
resident, conjugal relationship .... The fact that [the boyfriend] moved from the
[ex-wife's] residence ... has little bearing on the continuing nature of the
relationship. [The boyfriend] testified that he did so solely in response to the
instant litigation.... [I]t is reasonable to presume he will resume coresidency
when this litigation is terminated." Id. at 660. Frasco also is beside the point.
There is no allegation, let alone evidence or a finding, that Okland ended
the relationship on April1 as a pretext to prevent the termination of Bradley's
alimony obligation. This court should reject any assertions to the contrary,
enforce the plain language of the statute, and reverse on the ground that
cohabitation ended long before Bradley either filed his petition or established
cohabitation, assuming there was ever cohabitation under the Utah test.
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Conclusion

This court should reverse the panel opinion affirming the district court's
termination of alimony. Jillian and Okland did not cohabitate under Utah law.
The only finding is that Okland did not consider the California vacation house to
be his principal domicile or even his principal residence. Even if he had, Jillian
and Okland stayed together in the California house for only 42 days, which is not
11

more than a temporary or brief period of time." Finally, even if Jillian and
Okland had cohabitated, their relationship ended months before Bradley filed his
11

petition to terminate alimony and established" cohabitation. Under the plain
langue of section 30-3-5(10) of the Utah Code, the district court erred in
terminating alimony where cohabitation was not ongoing.
On any one of these grounds, this court should reverse and remand to
allow Jillian to request her attorney fees once she becomes the prevailing party in
these proceedings.
DATED this 31st day of October, 2016.
ZIMMERMAN }ONES BOOHER
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